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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law, and other potential
cases of interest. As a special project, the Associate Editors wrote the
Review for
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-STANDING TO APPEAL
IN RE JURAN & MOODY, INC.

In In re Juran & Moody, Inc.,1 the North Dakota Securities Commissioner appealed from the district court's dismissal of his appeal of
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).2 Upon review, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the Commissioner was entitled to
appeal under North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-15 and that the
3
Commissioner had standing to appeal.
In 1997, the Commissioner issued an order against Juran and
Moody Inc., ordering it to stop offering unregistered, nonexempt
securities; the Commissioner also ordered it to pay $175,000 for violations of securities laws. 4 After Juran and Moody filed objections to the
order, the Commissioner sought an ALJ to conduct a hearing, to issue
findings of fact, to issue conclusions of law, and to issue a final order. 5
The ALJ held a hearing and concluded that Juran and Moody did not
violate the securities laws, issuing a final order on April 20, 1999.6
The Commissioner then appealed to the district court, where Juran
and Moody asserted that the Commissioner lacked standing to appeal. 7
The district court concluded that "the agency has not established that it
has 'standing' for purposes of appealing its own final order," and it
granted Juran and Moody's motion to dismiss.8 Following this decision,
the Commissioner appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 9
Upon review, the Commissioner argued that his appeal was allowed
pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-15.10 The court
noted that section 28-32-15 was susceptible to "differing rational
meanings"; therefore, it concluded that the statute was ambiguous and
consequently subject to review. 1 1 In analyzing the statute, the court
concluded that any preclusion of an appeal by the Commissioner
1. 2000 ND 136,613 N.W.2d 503.
2. Juran & Moody, 1, 613 N.W.2d at 505.
3. Id.
4. Id. 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. 4, 613 N.W.2d at 505-06.
7. Id. 5,613 N.W.2d at 506.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. 6.
11. Id.
6-7. The court noted that the language within several subsections of this particular
code section resulted in ambiguity. Id. 7. For example, it noted that section 28-32-15(1) indicated
that any party to a proceeding heard by an administrative agency may appeal. Id. It also noted that
other subsections suggested that the Commissioner, as the agency, may not appeal. Id. (citing N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-15(4)-(6)).
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"would frustrate the apparent, although not explicit, legislative intent." 12
The court noted that the Commissioner had requested that the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) designate an ALJ to issue a final decision because Juran and Moody alleged that the Commissioner had
improperly destroyed documents that it had relied upon in issuing its
securities. 13 After analyzing the value of independence and impartiality
in administrative proceedings, the court concluded that to construe North
Dakota Century Code section 28-32-15 to preclude the Commissioner
14
from appealing would frustrate the legislative intent.
Yet the court also noted that the Commissioner must have standing
to appeal from an ALJ decision.1 5 Upon review, the court concluded
that the Commissioner satisfied the three standing requirements16 to
appeal from an agency decision; as such, it concluded that the Commissioner did in fact have standing to appeal from the ALJ's decision. 17
Based upon the foregoing, the court reversed the dismissal of the Commissioner's appeal and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. 18
CHILD CUSTODY-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

IN RE

C.R.H. v. C.H.

The North Dakota Department of Human Services (Department)
appealed from an order denying its motion to intervene in a parental
rights termination case and to amend the trial court's order terminating
M.H.'s parental rights over her child, C.R.H.19 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held the trial court erred when it denied the motion to
20
intervene and awarded visitation to M.H. in the termination order.
8-9, 613 N.W.2d at 506-07. The court reviewed the statute as directed under NORTH
12. Id.
DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section 1-02-39, which is the statutory section governing interpretation of
ambiguous legislation. Id.
13. Id. 14, 613 N.W.2d at 508.
14. Id. 15. The court noted that "where an agency requests the OAH designate an ALJ to issue
a final decision, [North Dakota law] allows the requesting agency to appeal from that final [issued
opinion] unless such appeal is otherwise [specifically] precluded." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
54-44.3-12.2, which precludes the Central Personnel Division from appealing an ALJ's decision).
15. Id. 16.
16. Id. 17. The court explained that a person had standing if the individual: "(1) participates in
the proceedings before an administrative agency, (2) is directly interested in the proceedings, and (3)
is factually aggrieved by the agency's decision." Id. (citing Application of Bank of Rhame, 231
N.W.2d 801, 808 (N.D. 1975)).
17. Id. 21,613 N.W.2d at 509.
18. Id. 28, 613 N.W.2d at 510.
19. In re C.R.H., 2000 ND 222, 1, 620 N.W.2d 175, 176.
20. Id.
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Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 2 1
In October 1998, the Stutsman County Department of Social
Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of M.H. to her
child C.R.H.22 M.H. agreed to termination of her rights on the condition
that she receive visitation privileges. 2 3 On December 30, 1998, the trial
court terminated her parental rights on the condition that she have the
24
right to visit with the child on his birthday and near other holidays.
The Department's Executive Director was given custody of the child. 2 5
On January 5, 2000, the Department filed a motion to intervene and to
amend the court's order. 26 On June 5, 2000, the district court found
against the Department, and on August 7, 2000, the Department
appealed. 2 7
In reviewing the district court's order, the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that the question of whether the Department had a right to
intervene was a question of law and therefore was fully reviewable. 2 8
The trial court's order provided that the matter would have to be
brought back to juvenile court if the child had not been adopted within a
year. 29 The court observed that although it had been over a year since
the termination of M.H.'s parental rights, C.R.H. had still not been
placed for adoption, and no legal guardianship or other permanent
living arrangement had been established by the court. 3 0 Therefore,
under North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-47 and the trial court's
own order, the Department, as the child's custodian, was obligated to
return to the court to further consider the matter. 3 1 Based on this, the
court found the Department had standing to bring the issues regarding
termination of parental rights and custody to the court for
32
reconsideration.
21. Id.
22. Id. 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. 3.
27. Id. at 177.
28. Id. 6 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 355 (N.D. 1996)).
29. Id. 7, 620 N.W.2d at 177-78.
30. Id. at 178.
31. Id. The relevant part of NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section 27-20-47 states:
If the child is not placed for adoption within twelve months after the date of the order
and a legal guardianship or other planned permanent living arrangement has not been
established by a court of competent jurisdiction, the child must be returned to the court
for entry of further orders for the care, custody, and control of the child.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-47(3) (Supp. 2001).

32. In re C.R.H. v. C.H., 2000 ND 222,

8, 620 N.W.2d 175, 178.
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In reviewing the termination order, the court quoted from North
Dakota law: "An order terminating parental rights of a parent terminates all [the] rights and obligations with respect to the child. . . . The
parent is not thereafter entitled to notice of proceedings for ... adoption
. . . nor has he any right to object . . . or . . . participate in the
proceedings. 3 3" The court further stated that North Dakota "statutes do
not vest ... discretionary authority [with] a court [to terminate parental
rights, and then to later] provide visitation rights or other privileges to
the terminated parent." 34 North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-46
requires unconditional termination of all legal rights and obligations. 35
The court stated that there was a strong public policy favoring
finality and stability in adoptions, and if it allowed conditional termination of parental rights, it would leave questions regarding such termination open to attack indefinitely. 36 Because the court found that the
district court had no right to conditionally terminate M.H.'s rights, the
case was remanded with directions that the trial court vacate the original
order and conduct further proceedings to decide the merits of the
petition to terminate M.H.'s parental rights. 3 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
DIcKIE V. FARMERS UNION OIL CO. OF LAMOURE

In Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of LaMoure38 the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota certified a question of law
to the Supreme Court of North Dakota to determine whether the North
Dakota Product Liability Statute of Repose 39 was constitutional. 40 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional
and created a classification in violation of Article I, Section 21 of the
North Dakota Constitution. 4 1
On August 5, 1998, a pipe that connected a gas storage tank to a
grain dryer on the Peter Schockman farm exploded, seriously burning
Lillian Maria Dickie. 4 2 LaMoure Farmers Union Oil Co. (Farmers) had
sold and installed the pipe twenty-three years earlier, in 1975.43
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. 9 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1991 & Supp. 1999)).
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46).
Id.
Id. 10.
Id. 13, 620 N.W.2d at 180.
2000 ND 111,611 N.W.2d 168.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08 (Supp. 1999).
Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 2000 ND 111, 1, 611 N.W.2d 168, 169.
Id.
Id. 2.
Id.
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Subsequent examination of the pipe revealed a leak. 4 4 The Dickies
claimed that Farmers did not protect the pipe against corrosion, which
caused the pipe to leak and generated the explosion that injured Lillian
Dickie. 45
The Dickies brought a products liability suit in the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota against Farmers for the
injuries suffered by Lillian.4 6 The Dickies claimed the pipe was in
violation of the National Fire Protection Association codes. 4 7 Farmers
contended that the North Dakota Statute of Limitation and Repose 4 8
barred the Dickies' claims. 49 The federal district court certified the
question of law to the Supreme Court of North Dakota per Rule 47 of
the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.50 The court held that
the statute of repose for product liability actions created an unconstitutional classification that violated the equal protection clause of the North
Dakota Constitution.51
In concluding that the statute was
unconstitutional, the court rejected Farmers' argument that there was a
close correspondence between the statutory classification and the goals
sought by the legislature. 52
Farmers argued that the court's analysis in Bellemare v. Gateway
Builders, Inc. 53 was applicable to this case because, in Bellemare, the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes are established by the NFPA,
International. See http://www.nfpa.org (last visited July 11, 2001). NFPA 1, the FIRE PREVENTION CODE.
provides the minimum standards that are necessary to establish a rational level of fire safety and
property security from risks caused by fire or explosion. See http://www.nfpa.org/Codes/ (last visited
July 11, 2001). NFPA 54, the NATIONAL FUEL GAS CODE, sets the minimum standards for "fuel gas
equipment installations, piping, and venting." Id.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08 (Supp. 2001).
49. Id. The 1995 statute of repose at issue in this case is codified at NORTH DAKOTACENTURY
CODE section 28-01.3-08, the North Dakota Product Liability Act Statute of Repose, and states in
relevant part:
Except as provided in subsections 4 and 5, there may be no recovery of damages in a
products liability action unless the injury, death, or property damage occurs within ten
years of the date of initial purchase . . . or within eleven years of the date of
manufacture of a product.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-08(1).
50. Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 2000 ND 111, 3, 611 N.W.2d 168, 169. Rule 47 of the
NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE states that the state supreme court may answer any
questions of law certified to it. N.D. R. App. P. 47. The question may be certified when the certifying
court is involved in a proceeding that questions the law of the state and the question is determinative of
the cause before it. Id.
51. Dickie, 13, 611 N.W.2d at 173. Article I, Section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution states
"[aill courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay."
52. Dickie, 13, 611 N.W.2d at 173.
53. 420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1988).
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court concluded that North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-44 did
not violate the North Dakota Constitution. 54 In Bellemare, however, the
court recognized the distinction between section 28-01-44, which applies
to planners, designers, and constructors of improvements to real property, and section 28-01.3-08, which applied to manufacturers and suppliers
of products. 5 5 Owners and occupiers of property have continuing
control of the property.5 6 Architects, contractors, engineers, and inspectors usually do not have control over the property after their jobs are
completed. 57 The court also cited to Vantage, Inc. v. CarrierCorp.58 in
which it recognized the distinction between the designers of a product or
improvement to real property and manufacturers of a product.5 9
The parties in Dickie also disagreed about whether the language of
section 28-01.3-08 was ambiguous and about the true purpose of the
statute. 60 Farmers argued that the 1995 legislation demonstrated a close
correspondence between the goals of the legislature and the classification
created. 6 1 However, the court examined the legislative intent of the
statute and determined that the legislature had the same objective in
enacting the 1995 statute as'it had in enacting the 1979 statute of repose
that was declared unconstitutional in Hanson v. Williams County.6 2
Farmers asserted that the 1979 statute of repose was "enacted to reduce
product liability insurance costs," but the 1995 statute of repose was
enacted "to provide a reasonable period of time for commencement of
products liability litigation." 6 3 The 1995 statute, Farmers argued,
provided a needed degree of certainty in the law. 6 4 The court
disagreed. 6 5 The court found the goals of the legislature in enacting the
54. Dickie, 12, 611 N.W.2d at 172-73.
55. Id. 10, 611 N.W.2d at 172 (citing Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733,
738 (N.D. 1988) and Yarbo v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 827-28 (Colo. 1982)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 467 N.W.2d 446 (N.D. 1991).
59. Vantage, 467 N.W.2d at 450; see also Dickie, 11, 611 N.W.2d at 172.
60. Dickie, 6, 611 N.W.2d at 170.
61. Id.
62. Id. 5 (examining Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986)).
63. Id. 6, 611 N.W.2dat 171.
64. Id. at 170-71 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(2) & (3) (Supp. 2001) for the proposition
that due to problems in the civil justice system, there was a compelling need for additional legislation to
establish distinct rules with respect to product liability matters). The legislature also stated that some of
the purposes of sections 28-01.3-08 and 28-01.3-09 were (1) to improve the way responsibility is
determined for the payment of products liability litigation damages; (2) to reconstitute a statute
creating a "reasonable" time in which products liability cases must be brought; and (3) to reenact, with
minor changes, portions of chapter 28-01.1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07.
65. Dickie, 9, 611 N.W.2d at 171-72.
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1995 statute of repose no more supportive than were the goals of the
66
legislature in enacting the 1979 statute.
The court in Dickie emphasized the rule of stare decisis.67 The court
said that although precedent is sometimes overruled, it was unwilling to
overturn the decision made in Hanson and to now find the reenactment
of the statute of repose constitutional. 68 The court restated what it said in
Hanson: when the issue is human life and safety there must be a rational
basis more than the economic interests of manufacturers or suppliers of
goods to justify the classification and the selection of a period of years. 69
Further, the court found no showing within any of the information
submitted in consideration of the 1995 legislation that lawsuits brought
by victims injured ten years after purchase or eleven years after manufacture compared to those injured within that time have "caused inequity, unfairness, or unreasonable exposure and unpredictability for manufacturers or suppliers." 70 The court thus held that there was not a close
enough correspondence between the legislative objectives and the
classifications created to withstand an equal protection challenge. 7 ' The
court therefore concluded that Section 28-01.3-08 was
unconstitutional. 72
CRIMINAL LAW-DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
CITY OF FARGO V. EGEBERG

On the evening of August 10, 1999, while two women were walking
on Fourth Street in Fargo, a man "pulled down his shorts and exposed
his buttocks" to them. 7 3 The man then entered a vehicle and drove
away from the scene. 7 4 One of the women reported the incident to a
police officer and provided the officer with the license number of the
vehicle the man entered. 7 5
After running a license check, the officer determined that the
vehicle was registered to Duane Egeberg. 76 The officer then proceeded
to Egeberg's address where she saw his vehicle parked. 77 The officer
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

13,611 N.W.2d at 173.

9, 611 N.W.2d at 172.
13, 611 N.W.2d at 173.
of Fargo v. Egeberg, 2000 ND 159,

3.

2, 615 N.W.2d 542, 543.
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then knocked on the door, and Egeberg stepped out of the house and
spoke with her about the incident. 7 8 The officer testified that Egeberg
stated that he had left a bar and restaurant and was attempting to tuck his
shirt into his shorts when his shorts had fallen down. 79 After doing this,
Egeberg then told the officer that he entered his vehicle and drove
home. 80 According to the officer, she detected a strong odor of alcohol
on Egeberg during their conversation and began conducting field
sobriety tests on him. 81 She then arrested Egeberg for driving under the
influence and informed him of his rights. 82 He agreed to submit to a
blood test.8 3 While transporting Egeberg to the hospital for the blood
test, Egeberg stated that "'he didn't feel very drunk,' 'he only had a
few beers,' and 'he was almost sober now."' 8 4
Egeberg was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 85 He moved to dismiss, arguing that the officer did not have
probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. 86 Egeberg
also moved to suppress the results of the blood test, claiming it was an
illegal search and seizure. 87 Egeberg further moved to suppress statements made to the officer, claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. 8 8 The trial court denied all of his
motions and Egeberg appealed. 89
Egeberg's first argument on appeal was that the officer lacked
"probable cause to transform her investigation for disorderly conduct
into an investigation for driving under the influence." 9 0 The court
stated that "[t]o establish probable cause to arrest a driver for driving
under the influence of alcohol, a law enforcement officer must observe
some signs of physical or mental impairment and have reason to believe
the driver's impairment is caused by alcohol." 9 1 The court reasoned
that Egeberg's dropping of his shorts, coupled with the strong odor of
alcohol on his breath, provided the officer with signs of physical or
mental impairment caused by alcohol. 92 Furthermore, the court cited the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 7.
Id. 8.
Id. 10, 615 N.W.2d at 545.
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fact that Egeberg admitted to driving his vehicle. 93 Additionally, the
court stated that Egeberg's arrest immediately after the administration of
94
the field sobriety tests indicated that he failed those tests.
Therefore, the court concluded that "[d]uring the course of the
disorderly conduct investigation, the officer obtained reasonably trustworthy incremental information about Egeberg's level of intoxication
which was sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in believing he had
driven while under the influence." 9 5 As a result, the court also
concluded that "[t]he results of Egeberg's blood test were obtained
incident to that lawful arrest, and the trial court did not err in refusing to
dismiss the charges against him, or in denying his motion to suppress the
results of the blood test." 9 6
In his second argument on appeal, Egeberg argued that the statements made to the officer were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 9 7 The court stated that, under
Miranda v. Arizona,9 8 the prosecution may not use statements made by
the defendant during "custodial interrogation" unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards. 9 9 The Supreme Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."100 The court reasoned
that "the officer's general investigatory questioning of Egeberg outside
his residence about a possible disorderly conduct was not a custodial
situation."1 0 1 Therefore, the court held the trial court did not err in
1 02
refusing to suppress Egeberg's statements.
CRIMINAL LAW-INVESTIGATORY VEHICLE STOPS

STATE V. LOH

In State v. Loh, 10 3 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. 11.
98. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
99. City of Fargo v. Egeberg, 2000 ND 159, 12, 615 N.W.2d 542, 545 (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
100. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
101. Egeberg, 13, 615 N.W.2d at 546 (citing State v. Martin, 543 N.W.2d 224, 228 (N.D.
1996)).
102. Id.
103. 2000 ND 188, 618 N.W.2d 477.
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concluding the police officer had probable cause to conduct an
investigatory vehicle stop.
At around 9:30 p.m. on May 6, 1999, after following Loh's vehicle
for approximately five miles, a law enforcement officer noticed Loh's
vehicle traveling slowly and crossing the fog line and the center line. 104
The police officer stopped Loh after the dispatcher indicated Loh was
the registered owner of the vehicle, and a driver's license check determined that Loh's license was suspended.105 After being stopped by the
officer, Loh identified himself and admitted he had a suspended driver's
license. 106 The officer detected an odor of alcohol and conducted field
sobriety tests after which the officer arrested Loh for driving under
suspension.10 7 After searching the vehicle, the officer found alcohol in
the vehicle but did not cite Loh for driving while intoxicated or having
an open container of an alcoholic beverage. 108
Loh filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the
investigatory stop, arguing that he had slowed down to look for a particular street and that he had not crossed either the center or the fog lines. 109
The trial court denied the motion, finding that the officer had probable
cause to stop the vehicle because of the vehicle's weaving, and since Loh
had been drinking, he bad a less clear recollection of the erratic driving
than the officer.l 1 0
On review, the court first noted that the trial court's decisions in
suppression matters should be accorded great deference because of its
ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. 1 1 1 The court stated the trial
court's decisions in suppression motions should be affirmed unless there
is "insufficient evidence to support the decision or the decision goes
against the manifest weight of the evidence.""12
Lob first argued that the officer did not have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that he was violating the law.'l 3 The court held that
although a reasonable suspicion requires more than a "mere hunch,"
104. Loh, 2, 618 N.W.2d at 478. The police officer confirmed Loh's vehicle speed as traveling
at thirty-two miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone and noted much in-lane weaving. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The alcohol found in the vehicle included one opened bottle that was almost empty. Id.
109. Id. 3.
110. Id.
111. Id. 4 (stating the trial court has the important opportunity of being able to observe the
witnesses).
112. Id. (citing State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 7, 559 N.W.2d 538).
113. Id. 6, 618 N.W.2d at 478-79. Loh contended that because the officer was unable to
identify him as the driver before the stop, the officer only had a mere hunch that Loh was breaking the
law. Id.
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the standard is a less stringent standard than probable cause. 114 The
court noted that even minor traffic violations will provide officers with
the requisite grounds for conducting an investigatory vehicle stop and as
soon as the officer observed Loh crossing the center line there was
probable cause to believe Loh violated the law.11 5 The court ruled that
once the officer had probable cause to stop Loh, the evidence obtained
from the stop was admissible.1 16
Loh next argued that an officer must be held to his or her true
reasons for stopping a vehicle and a court should not be allowed to
justify a stop with reasons for which the officers did not actually act. 117
The court rejected Loh's argument because an otherwise valid stop
should not become unreasonable merely because the officer's state of
mind does not perfectly match his or her legitimate reason for making
the stop.1 8 The court further held that it is not unreasonable, as a matter
of law, for an officer to follow a suspect driver for nearly five miles
before stopping the vehicle.119
In conclusion, the court affirmed Loh's conviction and the trial
court's denial of Loh's motion to suppress evidence because the officer
not only had reasonable and articulable suspicion but also had probable
cause to justify the vehicle stop.120 The court further concluded that
evidence from an otherwise legitimate stop should not be invalidated
because the officer suspected other criminal activity and followed Loh
for five miles before making the stop.y2 1
CRIMINAL LAW-JURY SELECTION AND SENTENCING
STATE V. ENTzi

In State v. Entzi, 122 Bruce Entzi appealed the final judgment entered
upon jury verdicts that found him guilty of two counts of gross sexual
imposition.1 2 3 Upon review, Entzi argued that reversible error was
committed when the trial court failed to conduct voir dire on the record,
114. Id. 5, 618 N.W.2d at 478 (citing Kahl v. Director, N.D. Dep't of Transp., 1997 ND 147,
12, 567 N.W.2d 474).
115.

Id.

7, 618 N.W.2d at 479.

The court cited NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section

39-10-08(1) which makes driving or weaving on the wrong half of the roadway a traffic violation. Id.
116. Id. 8 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).
117. Id. 9. Loh asserted that the officer never indicated that he suspected any alcohol-related
or criminal activity after the officer followed him on "a five mile odyssey." Id.
118. Id. 12.
119. Id. 13, 618 N.W.2d at 479-80 (relying on its previous decision in Johnson v. North Dakota
Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995)).
120. Id. 14.
121. Id.

122. 2000 ND 148, 615 N.W.2d 145.
123. Entzi, 1,615 N.W.2d at 147.
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thereby making a transcript of the jury selection unavailable.1 24 Entzi
admitted that he did not request that jury selection be conducted on the
record, but neither the defense attorney nor the prosecutor remembered
discussing whether jury selection was on the record. 125 Furthermore, in
its statement and approval of the record under North Dakota Rules of
Appellate Procedure 10, the trial court stated that whether jury selection
26
would be recorded was not discussed by either party.1
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that in addressing nonevidentiary proceedings, one must request recording. 127 Consequently, the
court concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct voir dire on the
28
record did not alone constitute reversible error.1
After addressing several other evidentiary issues, the court then
focused upon Entzi's claim that he was entitled to a new sentencing,
because his sentencing was conducted in the wrong county.12 9 Entzi was
30
tried in McIntosh County, where the offenses were committed.1
However, the trial court scheduled the sentencing and ordered it to be
1
held in Burleigh County.13
Upon review, the court noted that "sentencing is a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding." 13 2 Furthermore, the court specifically noted that
in deciding where a sentencing hearing should be held, the convenience
of witnesses is a factor.1 3 3 Entzi had made a timely request for his
sentencing hearing to be conducted in McIntosh County, and the court
held that refusal of such a request was "inconsonant with N.D. Sup. Ct.
Admin. R. 6(B)."134 Therefore, in reliance upon the importance of the
sentencing function and the court's preference for local proceedings, it
held that the trial court abused its discretion when it conducted the
defendant's sentencing hearing in Burleigh County. 135 Based upon the
124. Id. 3.
125. Id. 4, 615 N.W.2d at 147-48.
126. Id. 5, 615 N.W.2d at 148.
127. Id. 6 (citing Fenske v. Fenske, 542 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1996); State v. Kunkel, 366 N.W.2d
799 (N.D. 1985); State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1983)).
128. Id. 8.
129. Id. 26, 615 N.W.2d at 152.
130. Id. 27.
131. Id. The defendant wanted the sentencing hearing to be held in McIntosh County so as to
make any appearances by his witnesses more convenient. Id.
132. Id. 28 (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 776 (N.D. 1980)).
133. Id. 29 (citing Stonewood Hotel Corp., Inc. v. Davis Dev., Inc., 447 N.W.2d 286, 289 (N.D.
1989)).
134. Id. N.D. Sup. Cr. ADMiN. R. 6(B) states that residents of the various counties should receive
judicial services in their own county. Id.
135. Id. at 153.
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foregoing, the court concluded that Entzi was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.1 3 6
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURES
CITY OF JAMESTOWN V. DARDIS

In City of Jamestown v. Dardis,137 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that the evidence against
Dardis should have been suppressed because his home was entered by
the police without a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 38
On the evening of January 29, 1999, at about 11:30 p.m., the
Jamestown police responded to a call to investigate a loud party in an
apartment.1 39 At the scene, the police officer heard loud music coming
from the apartment and knocked at the apartment door. 14 0 The police
officer continued to knock on the door until a young woman opened the
door. 14 1 Once the door was opened, the officer smelled the odor of
alcohol coming from inside the apartment and noticed a number of
young people inside. 14 2 John Dardis came out of the bedroom after the
officer asked to speak with the legal resident of the apartment. 14 3 The
officer asked Dardis if anyone in the apartment was twenty-one years old
or older to which Dardis shook his head to indicate no. 144 When the
officer asked Dardis for his identification, Dardis loudly answered that
he did not have any identification, and he began to walk away.14 5 The
officer twice told Dardis to stop and come back, but Dardis did not stop
until another young man grabbed Dardis in an attempt to calm him
down. 146 The officer testified that this resulted in a shoving match until
Dardis broke free from the young man and continued to walk away.147
136. Id.
137. 2000 ND 186, 618 N.W.2d 495.
138. Dardis,9 1, 618 N.W.2d at 496.
139. Id. T2.
140. Id. After knocking at the door, the police officer could hear people inside warning that
"It's the cops. The cops are here." Id.
141. Id. TT 3-4, 618 N.W.2d at 496-97. There was a conflict in the testimony about whether or
not the officer stepped into the apartment when the young woman opened the door, but the trial court
found that the officer had walked into the apartment when the door was opened. Id. 4, 618 N.W.2d
at 497.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. 5. The officer, at this point, had established that Dardis' breath smelled of alcohol and
his eyes were very bloodshot. Id.
145. Id. The officer testified that Dardis was becoming very obnoxious and disorderly at this
point in the encounter. Id.
146. Id. 6.
147. Id.

20011

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

603

At that point, the officer stepped further into the apartment and grabbed
hold of Dardis to keep him from walking away.1 48 The officer arrested
14 9
Dardis for consumption of alcohol and disorderly conduct.
Dardis entered a conditional plea of guilty with the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of entry
into his home. 150 The trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence,
and Dardis appealed his convictions for minor in possession/consumption of alcohol and disorderly conduct.151
The North Dakota Supreme Court began by stating that the standard of review of a district court's denial of a suppression motion is well
established in that conflicts in testimony should be resolved in favor of
affirming the trial court's decision. 152 However, the court ruled that
whether the findings of fact meet a legal standard is a question of law
that is fully reviewable. 15 3 The court turned to the issue of warrantless
searches of a home and recited that such searches are presumptively
unreasonable. 154 The court concluded that warrantless searches are
unreasonable unless the government can show that the search was within
one of the few recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 15 5
The State first argued that when the young woman opened the door
to the apartment, the officer had implied consent to enter. 15 6 However,
the court countered by restating that, "to sustain a finding of consent,
the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have
consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely
showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police
from entering."157 The court pointed out that it was unaware of any
holding in any jurisdiction that the opening of a door with the knowledge of a police officer on the threshold is an invitation to enter the
home.1 5 8
The trial court found that even if the officer did not have consent to
go beyond the doorway, the police officer's entry was justified because
148. Id. Dardis also grabbed the officer's wrist but released it when the officer told Dardis to do
so. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. 1,618 N.W.2d at 496.
151. Id.
152. Id. 7, 618 N.W.2d at 497 (noting the district court is in a superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence).
153. Id. (citing State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, 12, 572 N.W.2d 106).
154. Id. 8 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), which states "[t]he Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant").
155. Id. 9, 618 N.W.2d at 498.
156. Id. 10.
157. Id. 11 (citing State v. DeCoteau, 1999 ND 77, 11,592 N.W.2d 579).
158. Id. 14, 618 N.w.2d at 499.
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of exigent circumstances. 1 59 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, noting that probable cause to believe minors were illegally
consuming alcohol did not create exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless entry into a home.1 6 0 The court further rejected the argument that the shoving match between Dardis and the other young man
was an exigent circumstance because it was the officer's entry into the
apartment that brought about the confrontation.161
In conclusion, the court ruled that at the time of the officer's entry
into the apartment, no consent or exigent circumstances existed. 16 2
Absent one of these exceptions to the warrant requirement at the time of
entry, any evidence gained would violate the Fourth Amendment and
must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.1 63
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING
CLARK V. STATE

Daniel J. Clark appealed from a judgment which dismissed his
application for post-conviction relief.1 6 4 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that it was harmless error for the trial court to impose an enhanced sentence under the dangerous special offender statute without
allowing the jury to specifically find the predicate facts supporting the
enhanced sentence.1 65
Clark was charged with the January 17, 1996, murder of George
Girodengo.1 6 6 A jury found him guilty of manslaughter, a class B
felony under North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-16-02.167 The
trial court sentenced Clark to the ten-year maximum under North
Dakota Century Code section 12.1-32-01(3) and imposed a sentence of
an additional five years as Clark was found to be a dangerous special
offender under North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-32-09(2)(b),

based on his use of a firearm in committing the offense.1 68

159. Id. 116.
160. Id. (citing City of Fargo v. Lee, 1998 ND 126, 13, 580 N.W.2d 580).
161. Id. 18, 618 N.W.2d at 500. The court stated that "(I]aw enforcement's inappropriate
actions, even if unintentional, cannot ordinarily create the exigent circumstances to justify the entry
for the purpose of the suppression motion." Id.
162. Id. 19.
163. Id. (citing State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, 9, 572 N.W.2d 106).
164. Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, 1, 621 N.W.2d 576.
165. Id. 2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section 12.1-32-09(1) says in relevant part, "[a] court
may sentence a convicted offender to an extended sentence as a dangerous special offender ...
in
accordance with the provisions of this section." Id. 10, 621 N.W.2d at 579.
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In his appeal, Clark relied on the constitutional rule set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey. 16 9 In that case,
the Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "a fact used to enhance a criminal sentence
beyond the statutory maximum for the crime committed must be
decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."170 Clark argued that
under this rule the court should eliminate the five-year enhanced sentence, or at least remand this issue for redetermination by the jury.171
In its analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court first pointed out
that there is a conflict among the lower courts as to whether to apply the
Apprendi rule retroactively.1 72 However, the court noted that there was
no need to decide the question here because, under the circumstances of
this case, the trial court's failure to apply the rule would constitute only
harmless error. 173
The court observed that under Apprendi, a jury cannot enhance a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the crime committed, unless
the jury finds the facts upon which the enhancement is based, beyond a
reasonable doubt.17 4 Here, Clark used a firearm in committing the
offense, and this was the fact upon which the five-year enhancement was
based. 175 However, Clark had admitted to this fact already.1 7 6 Clark's
only defense at trial was that he acted in self-defense; he never denied
using a firearm. 177 Because the only predicate fact needed to enhance
Clark's sentence was in effect already established, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found that failure to submit this issue to the jury was
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 178 The judgment of the trial
court was affirmed.17 9
169. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In Apprendi, the defendant was convicted of possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose, based on his firing shots into an African-American family's home.
See Clark, 5, 621 N.W.2d at 576 (explaining the facts of Apprendi). His sentence was enhanced
under New Jersey's hate crime statute, after the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the shooting was racially motivated. Id.
170. Clark, 3, 621 N.W.2d at 576 (citing Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
171. Id. 3.
172. Id. 7; see also United States v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1064 (D. Minn. 2000) (stating
that the Apprendi rule should apply retroactively). But see Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th
Cir. 2000) (stating that the Apprendi rule should not apply retroactively).
173. Clark, 9, 621 N.W.2d at 579.
174. Id. 11, 621 N.W.2d at 580. The court observed that there is an exception to the Apprendi
rule when the sentence enhancement is based upon a prior conviction. Id.
175. Id. 12,
176. Id. 16, 621 N.W.2d at 581.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 582.
179. Id. 17.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION

STATE V. RUBEY

On May 17, 1988, Larry Gene Rubey pled guilty to two counts of
gross sexual imposition for offenses committed in 1985 and 1986, and
he was placed on supervised probation. 180 In October of 1990, Rubey's
probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. 18 1
After he was released from prison, Rubey moved to Washburn, North
Dakota, in McLean County. 18 2 On August 3, 1996, Rubey registered as
a sex offender.' 8 3 As part of the registration, Rubey signed a form
acknowledging that he would inform the McLean County Sheriff's
Office of any change in his address. 18 4
In March of 1997, Rubey left Washburn and moved to a hospitality
house in Bismarck for a few days. 18 5 He then moved to Fargo for a few
days to help with volunteer flood relief. 186 Thereafter, Rubey began
work as a trucker in Mandan and did not stay at any one place for more
than three or four nights. 187 In May or June of 1997, Rubey obtained a
post office box address in Mandan.188 Rubey did not, however, notify
the McLean County Sheriffs Office of any change in his address after
he left Washburn. 189 Thus, Rubey was charged and subsequently found
guilty of violating the sex offender registration requirement in McLean
County. 190

On appeal Rubey argued that the charges against him should have
been dismissed "because the district court in which Rubey was convicted
in 1988 failed to provide [him] . . . notice of his duty to register."1 9 1

The court rejected this argument because the registration requirement
did not exist when Rubey convicted in 1988 or when his probation was
revoked in 1990; therefore, the district court could not have notified him
of a registration requirement. 192 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the statute applicable to Rubey's registration required him to register not
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
protection
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

State v. Rubey, 2000 ND 119, 2, 611 N.W.2d 888, 889.
Id.
Id. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. 4. Rubey was ordered to leave his Washburn residence pursuant to a permanent
order. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 5.
Id. 6,611 N.W.2d at 889-90.
Id. 8, 611 N.W.2d at 890.
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only if he had been so ordered by a court, but also if he had been
convicted as a sex offender within ten years prior to August 1, 1995.193
Therefore, the court concluded that the district court's failure to inform
Rubey of the registration requirement did not relieve him of his obligation to register. 194
Rubey also argued that, because he lived out of his truck and only
stayed in one place for three or four days, the State failed to prove he
changed his residence. 195 The court stated that the registration statute
under which Rubey was convicted required sex offenders to notify law
enforcement of changes in "address" rather than a change in "residence;" therefore, the legislature intended to include changes in both
mailing addresses and residential addresses.1 96 The court reasoned that
"[a]llowing sex offenders to circumvent the registration process by
physically leaving one residence without technically acquiring a new
residence would permit the offender to 'slip through the cracks,' disappear from law enforcement view and thus thwart the purpose for which
[the] law was enacted."1 9 7 Thus, the court concluded that if a sexual
offender "has no new residing address, but has a new mailing address,
the offender must notify authorities of the new address."1 98 Therefore,
the court held that Rubey violated the registration requirement when he
left Washburn and obtained a post office box address in Mandan. 19 9
Justice Kapsner, joined by Justice Maring, dissented. 20 0 Justice
Kapsner stated that she agreed with the majority's analysis and interpretation of "address" as used in the statute. 20 1 However, she would have
held that the application of North Dakota Century Code section
12.1-32-15 "to Rubey is a violation of the ex post facto provisions of
2
the federal and state constitutions." 20
193. Id. 8-9 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(3) (1997 & Supp. 1999)).
194. Id. 11,611 N.W.2d at 891.
195. Id. 12.
196. Id.
13-14 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(6) (1997 & Supp. 1999)). The court also
stated that it was significant that the legislature used the term "address" rather than the terms
"residence, address, or location" from the statute on which section 12.1-32-15(6) was patterned. Id.
15 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(f)(1) (West 1999)).
197. Id. 18, 611 N.W.2d at 892.
198. Id. 19.
199. Id. 20 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(6) (1997 & Supp. 1999)).
200. Id. 22 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
OWENS V. STATE

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Earl L.
Owens' application for post-conviction relief. 20 3 In 1996, Owens was
convicted of two counts of theft by deception. 2 04 Since 1996, Owens
filed numerous applications for post-conviction relief.2 05 Owens' last
motion for post-conviction relief was filed on March 15, 2000.206 The
district court dismissed Owens' request. 2 07 Owens appealed the latest
denial on the grounds that his attorney failed to file a direct appeal, as
Owens had instructed him to do.208
Owens argued that the courts had not addressed the issue of whether
or not he was been denied the right to a direct appeal of his
conviction. 20 9 Owens presented this and similar issues to the district
court and the North Dakota Supreme Court on prior motions. 2 10 The
court concluded that there was no evidence presented that Owens had
21
been denied a right to appeal. 1
On appeal, the State argued that Owens' actions were a misuse of
process. 2 12 A misuse of process may occur when a party fails to raise a
claim in a proceeding or files numerous applications that are
frivolous. 2 13 The court noted that it had previously addressed Owens'
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 14 Continuing, the court
noted that Owens had numerous opportunities to raise the direct appeal
issue. 2 15 The court concluded that Owens' claim was only a variation of
his previous arguments that had been addressed by both the district court
and the North Dakota Supreme Court and that failure to raise the issue in
Owens' prior post-conviction arguments constituted a misuse of
2 16
process.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Owens v. State, 2001 ND 15, 1, 621 N.W.2d 566.
Id. 2.
Id.
3-6, 621 N.W.2d at 567.
Id. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. 10, 621 N.W.2d at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id. 12.
Id.
Id. 13.
Id. 15.
Id. 15-16.
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The court then addressed the issues raised by the Justice Kapsner.
The dissent relied upon Roe v. Flores-Ortega2 17 to suggest reversal in the
present case. 2 18 The court then reasoned that Owens' claims were not
similar to those in Roe. 2 19 Unlike in Roe, Owens, in his previous
petitions, did not indicate that he had directed his attorney to file a direct
appeal. 220 Additionally, the court noted that Owens' previous petitions
contradicted this new assertion. 22 1
The court noted that claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are
to be brought by post-conviction relief and not by direct appeal. 222
Therefore, the court indicated it was clear that Owens' claims were
properly covered by the post-conviction petitions. 2 23 Additionally, the
court noted that the record did not support the idea that Owens' representation was constitutionally deficient. 224 The court noted that Owens
did not raise his claim at the earliest opportunity, unlike in Roe.22 5 The
court also noted that Owens was not "abandoned" or deprived of review
of his claims. 2 26 The court also noted that Owens was not foreclosed
from raising his allegations of error in his trial; therefore prejudice is not
presumed. 2 27
Chief Justice Gerald VandeWalle concurred in the opinion. 22 8 He
agreed with the legal analysis in the dissent but would not have reached
the same decision. 22 9 He noted that numerous proceedings often cause
harm to an applicant for post-conviction relief and pointed out that the
court cannot ferret out all issues to determine which ones have merit. 230
Chief Justice VandeWalle also noted that a number of issues raised by
Owens failed to have supporting authority.231 He indicated that the court
will not address issues that are not thoroughly briefed and argued. 232 In
light of the number of petitions, the number of claims, and the failure to
217. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
218. Owens v. State, 2001 ND 15, 17, 621 N.W.2d 566, 568-69.
219. Id. 19, 621 N.W.2d at 569.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. 20.
223. Id.
224. Id. 22, 621 N.W.2d at 570.
225. Id. 23.
226. Id. 24.
227. Id. 26, 621 N.W.2d at 570-7 1.
228. Id. 30, 621 N.W.2d at 571. Justice William Newman joined in the concurrence. Id. 35,
621 N.W.2d at 572.
229. Id. 30, 621 N.W.2d at 571.
230. Id. 31.
231. Id.
232. Id. 32, 621 N.W.2d at 572.
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adequately support the claims, Chief Justice VandeWalle found Owens'
23 3
application to be a misuse of process.
Justice Kapsner, joined by Justice Maring, wrote a dissenting opinion which asserted that under Roe, Owens should be afforded a hearing
to determine if his representation was ineffective because of a failure to
file an appeal. 2 34 Under the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) the representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the representation preju23 5
diced the defendant.
Justice Kapsner stated that Owens was entitled to a hearing because
2 36
his attorney failed to comply with Owens' request for a direct appeal.
She noted that Owens asked his attorney to appeal at their first meeting
and again the day after his sentencing. 2 37 Justice Kapsner reasoned that
Owens was in a "Catch 22" situation because he had the burden of
proving his attorney was ineffective but could not prove his case for the
same reason. 2 38 She argued that Owens was presumptively prejudiced by
his attorney's failure to file the requested appeal, because it deprived
Owens of his right to appeal. 239 Unlike the majority, Justice Kapsner
argued the lengthy history of Owens' case should not be used to deny
relief where the history was due to his attorney. 24 0 She focused on the
fact that part of the lengthy history was because Owens filed his own
motions and then the trial court admonished him to work with his
attorney who refused to file the requested relief. 2 4 1 She argued that
Owens was denied the opportunity to have a court address the claim that
he presented. 242 Based upon this reasoning, Justice Kapsner would grant
Owens an evidentiary hearing to determine if his representation was
unreasonable. 24 3
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SENTENCING
STATE V. STEEN

Vance Steen was convicted of negligent homicide, leaving the scene
of an accident involving death or personal injury, and driving in
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

33.
36.
37.
40, 621 N.W.2d at 573.

41, 621 N.W.2d at 574.
43.
46.
47.
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violation of a restricted license after he drove over Darren Foster on a
gravel road. 2 44 On appeal, Steen first argued his "negligent homicide
conviction should be reversed because the jury was given a general
verdict form for negligent homicide which contained a special
interrogatory inquiring whether the conviction was based in part on
evidence of Steen operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol." 24 5 At trial the prosecutor requested the special interrogatory,
but the trial court rejected its use and ruled that a general verdict form
would be used instead. 246 Nevertheless, the jury was inadvertently given
2 47
the special interrogatory form and answered it in the affirmative.
The court found that it was proper for the trial court to reject the
special interrogatory. 24 8 The court further found that although the
special interrogatory was nonetheless erroneously submitted to the jury,
Steen's conviction would not be reversed unless "the error was so
prejudicial that substantial injury occurred and a different decision
would have resulted without the error." 2 49 The court concluded "[t]he
error in submitting the incorrect verdict form to the jury was not prejudicial to Steen because the form instructed the jury to answer the interrogatory only if the jury found Steen guilty of negligent homicide." 250
Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he inadvertent admission of the
incorrect verdict form did not open the door for the jury's consideration
of evidence of Steen's alcohol consumption because evidence of intoxication can be relevant in a negligent homicide case regardless of the
mandatory minimum sentence provisions." 2 5 1 Therefore, the court
concluded that the erroneous submission of the incorrect verdict form
did not constitute reversible error. 2 52
Steen also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident because "the prosecution
failed to prove that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident, and assuming he was the driver, the prosecution failed to prove
that he did not provide the information required by [North Dakota
Century Code section] 39-08-06."253 The court found that the evidence
244. State v. Steen, 2000 ND 152, 1, 615 N.W.2d 555, 557.
245. Id. 7,615 N.W.2d at 558.
246. Id. 8, 615 N.W.2d at 558-59.
247. Id.
248. Id. 11, 615 N.W.2d at 560.
249. Id. 13 (citing State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 442 (N.D. 1995)).
250. Id. 14.
251. Id. 15.
252. Id. at 561.
253. Id. 18. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section 39-08-06 (1997) mandates that after an
accident involving death or personal injury, the driver must stop or return to the accident scene and
provide his or her name, address, and registration number for his or her vehicle.
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showed that skid marks near Foster's body were similar to Steen's
pickup. 254 Also, Steen told his girlfriend that he might have run over
Foster. 255 Furthermore, Steen told his girlfriend that Foster was gasping
2 56
when he found him and that there were no other vehicles on the road.
Lastly, Steen did not acknowledge during discussions with law enforce2 57
ment personnel that he was the driver of the vehicle that struck Foster.
Therefore, the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to find Steen
guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal
injury. 258
Steen's last argument was that the trial court violated Rule
32(c)(4)(E) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing
to make a finding on controverted information in the presentence
investigation report. 259 The statements at issue were statements made by
Steen's ex-wife, Stacey Myers. 2 60 The court stated that, under Rule 32,
trial courts "may make implicit findings on disputed factual questions
by accepting the government's recommendations at the sentencing
hearing, or by adopting factual findings in the presentence investigation
report." 2 6 1
Applying this standard, the court found that the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 32 because its ruling on Steen's objections was
ambiguous. 262 However, the court found that the trial court would have
been legally justified in accepting either Steen's or Myers' version of
the facts in the presentence report. 263 Therefore, the court concluded
that resentencing was not appropriate. 2 64 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to the trial court to allow the trial court to "prepare a
written record of its findings on the controverted statements and attach it
to the presentence investigation report." 2 65
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

State v. Steen, 2000 ND 152, 19, 615 N.W.2d 555, 561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 20.
Id. 21 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(4)(E)).
Id. 22, 615 N.W.2d at 561-62.
Id. 26, 615 N.W.2d at 563 (citations omitted).
Id. 27.
Id. 30.
Id.
Id. 31, 615 N.W.2d at 564.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW-WRONGFUL TERMINATION
THOMPSON V. ASSOCIATED POTATO GROWERS, INC.

Associated Potato Growers, Inc. (Associated), employed Dennis
Thompson as a general manager under a contract that ran from August
1, 1991, through July 31, 1992, with an option for Thompson to extend
26 6
and renew the agreement for up to two one-year consecutive terms.
"On May 28, 1993, Associated's board of directors met to discuss
allegations that Thompson had altered grades of potatoes and changed
On June 10, 1993, after reviewing a
growers' records." 2 6 7
"mini-audit" of the company's accounts, the board decided to
terminate Thompson, without cause, subject to legal review of his
contract. 26 8 On June 17, after listening to Thompson's explanation for
his actions, the board decided to terminate Thompson for cause pursuant
to paragraph fourteen of the employment contract which provided that
"the EMPLOYER may terminate this Agreement immediately for
material violation of the EMPLOYER'S policies or material breach of
the provisions of this Agreement, including specifically the failure to
26 9
perform his duties as required hereunder."
Thompson then sued Associated for wrongful termination. 27 0 The
trial court decided "Thompson did not commit a material violation of
the employer's policies or a material breach of the provisions of the
employment agreement, and Thompson's actions were not dishonest but
were intended to insure fair compensation for potato growers." 27 1
Therefore the trial court decided Associated did not have cause to
272
terminate Thompson and awarded him $129,400 in damages.
The first issue addressed by the court on appeal was whether Associated could terminate Thompson for good cause even though the employment contract provided reasons for termination that did not specifically
mention good cause. 2 73 The court found that, "[a]lthough Associated
and Thompson could have contracted for an exclusive list of grounds
for termination, the language of this contract does not say termination
for cause is limited only to the reasons specifically enumerated in
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Thompson v. Assoc. Potato Growers, Inc., 2000 ND 95,
Id. 3.
Id. 4.
Id.
Id. 5,610 N.W.2d at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. 11, 610 N.W.2d at 57.

2, 610 N.W.2d 53, 55.

614

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:589

paragraph 14."274 Therefore, the court concluded that the contract
permitted "termination for cause, which includes, but is not limited to,
the reasons stated in paragraph 14."275
The next issue addressed by the court was "whether there was a
breach of the employment contract, which raises issues about
institutional responsibility for the determination of cause for
termination." 276 In addressing this issue the court adopted the objective
standard of Cotran v. Rollins Hall International, Inc. 27 7 Under that
standard, an employer is justified in terminating an employee for good
cause for
fair and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of
the employer, which are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious,
unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual. A reasoned
conclusion, in short, supported by substantial evidence
gathered through an adequate investigation that includes notice
of the claimed misconduct and a chance for the employee to
respond. 27 8
Furthermore, the court stated that an adequate investigation does not
require the same formal proceeding as trial. 279 Instead, it found that "an
adequate investigation may be satisfied by a variety of flexible procedures which afford employees a fair opportunity to present their
position." 2 80 The court reasoned that the objective standard was the
preferred approach because "[a]llowing a trier of fact to second guess
an employer's decision under these, or similar circumstances could
impose significant conflicts on employers in terms of their contractual
relationship with employees and their fiduciary responsibilities" to their
shareholders.2 8
The court found that the trial court had not applied this objective
good-faith standard in evaluating Associated's decision to terminate
Thompson.2 82 The court reasoned that the trial court did not decide
"whether Associated had fair and honest reasons, regulated by an
274. Id. 12.
275. Id.
276. Id. 13.
277. 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
278. Thompson v. Assoc. Potato Growers, Inc., 2000 ND 95, 20,610 N.W.2d 53, 59 (quoting
Cotran, 948 P.2d at 422).
279. Id.
280. Id. (quoting Cotran, 948 P.2d at 422).
281. Id. 18 (citing Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 901 P.2d 693, 702 n.5 (Nev. 1995)).
282. Id. 21.
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283
objective good-faith determination, for terminating Thompson."
Furthermore, the court stated that the trial court's "statements about the
degree of investigation in this case suggest the court believed a more
formalistic procedure was required." 2 84 Therefore, the court concluded
"the trial court erred by not applying an objective good-faith standard
285
for deciding whether Associated had cause to terminate Thompson."
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE
MARSCHNER V. MARSCHNER

Richard and Carol Marschner were divorced after thirty-seven years
of marriage. 2 86 The trial court awarded the family farm to Richard and
ordered that Carol receive $50,000 in cash over ten years as her share of
the property distribution. 28 7 The court found no need to award Carol
spousal support, in light of the $50,000 she would receive and the
$84,000 she had inherited. 28 8 After the divorce trial, Carol moved for a
new trial. 289 Her motion was denied and she appealed. 290
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Carol argued that
she received her inheritance after she was separated, and therefore it
should not have been included in the marital estate. 29 1 The court rejected this argument, saying that North Dakota law requires inclusion of
such inherited property. 2 92
Next, the court analyzed the trial court's denial of spousal
support. 2 93 The trial court awarded a $50,000 cash payment to Carol,
283. Id. 22, 610 N.W.2d at 60.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Marschner v. Marschner, 2001 ND 4, 1, 621 N.W.2d 339, 341.
287. Id. 8, 621 N.W.2d at 342. The trial court's reason for giving the farm intact to Richard
was that it wanted to preserve the family farm. Id. 17, 621 N.W.2d at 344.
288. Id. 11, 621 N.W.2d at 343. In making the spousal support determination, the trial court
applied the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Id. 9, 621 N.W.2d at 342. Factors to consider under the guidelines include:
the respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and
conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and
necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as
shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing
capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other
matters as may be material.
Id. (citing Riehl v. Riehl, 1999 ND 107, 8, 595 N.W.2d at 10, 13).
289. Id. I, 621 N.W.2d at 341.
290. Id.
291. Id. 3.
292. Id. 3, 5 (citing Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978)), which states that "[a]n
asset accumulated while [the parties] are still married is includable in the marital estate even (if the
parties have] separated").
293. ld. 6, 621 N.W.2d at 341-42.
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but no other support, finding that she was not a disadvantaged spouse. 294
The court determined that this finding conflicted with the record. 295 The
Marschners were married in 1962, and Carol was fifty-eight when they
divorced, with limited job skills.296 Both Richard and Carol devoted
themselves to the family farm, and now she would no longer be able to
work the farm to get a return on her investment. 29 7 Based on her duties
as a homemaker and helper for thirty-seven years, the court found she
was a disadvantaged spouse who had "foregone opportunities or lost
advantages as a consequence of the marriage and who ha[d] contributed
during the marriage to the supporting spouse's increased earning
capacity ."298
The trial court had awarded the family farm to Richard in an
attempt to preserve it intact, but the court stated that preserving the
family farm was not to be done at all costs. 29 9 The court stated that
preserving the farm in this case would actually increase the potential for
economic harm. 30 0 The court explained that Carol would be required to
deplete her cash property distribution for living expenses, while Richard
would get to keep the farm. 30 1 Therefore the property division was not
equitable. 30 2 The court stated that a better solution would be to determine whether the farm was profitable. 303 If so, part of the profits could
go as support to Carol. 3 04 If not, then the farm should be sold and the
proceeds divided between the parties. 30 5 The judgment of the lower
court was reversed, and the case remanded, to determine the appropriate
method of compensating Carol. 30 6
Justice Sandstrom dissented. 30 7 Justice Sandstrom believed the
district court's findings of no spousal disadvantage and no need for
spousal support were supported by the record, and he would affirm. 308
He believed the majority was substituting its judgment for that of the
district court. 30 9 He argued that the evidence did not support the conclu294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. 8, 621 N.W.2d at 342.
Id. 9 12, 621 N.W.2d at 343.
Id. 2, 621 N.W.2d at 341.
Id. 12, 621 N.W.2d at 343.
Id. 10, 621 N.W.2d at 342.
Id. 21, 621 N.W.2d at 344.
Id.
Id. 22.
Id.
Id. 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. 9 23, 621 N.W.2d at 345.
Id. 9 26-40, 621 N.W.2d at 346-47 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. 39, 621 N.W.2d at 347.
Id. 28, 621 N.W.2d at 346.
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sion that Carol had foregone any opportunity or that Richard had any
increased earning capacity. 3 10 Justice Sandstrom also reasoned that it
was illogical to conclude that the farm might produce income for
Richard, but the $134,000 which Carol received could not produce
11
income. 3
Justice Neumann also dissented, stating he believed the majority had
retried the case. 3 12 Considering how uncertain Richard and Carol's
economic futures were, Justice Neumann could not say that the trial
3 13
court's result was clearly erroneous.
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHANGE OF CUSTODY
MAYO V. MAYO

In Mayo v. Mayo, 3 14 Pamela Mayo, now known as Pamela Banjac,
appealed from an amended judgment changing custody of the parties'
three minor children from her to William M. Mayo. 3 15 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that
there had been a substantial change in circumstances which, in the best
3 16
interests of the children, required a change in custody.
In 1995, Banjac and Mayo were divorced. 3 17 The primary custody
of the three children was awarded to Banjac, and Mayo was awarded
reasonable visitation. 3 18 Four years later, on March 4, 1999, Mayo
contended there had been a change in circumstances and moved for a
change of custody. 3 19 Testimony was presented showing Banjac suffered "from fibromyalgia and migraine headaches, among other problems, and had symptoms of depression due to her chronic pain." 32 0 The
trial court found that Mayo had shown that Banjac was unable to adequately care for the children and her inability was a significant change
of circumstances. 32 1 The trial court also found it necessary to change
custody "because of the risk of significant psychological damage to the
children if Banjac retained custody." 322 Thus, the trial court granted
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. 29.
Id.
Id. 41, 621 N.W.2d at 347 (Neumann, J., dissenting).
Id. 41, 621 N.W.2d at 348.
2000 ND 204, 619 N.W.2d 631.
Mayo, 1, 619 N.W.2d at 633.
Id.
Id. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. 4, 619 N.W.2d at 633-34.
Id. 12, 619 N.W.2d at 635.
Id.

618

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:589

Mayo's motion to change custody of the three minor children.3 2 3
Banjac appealed. 32 4
Banjac contended that the trial court erred in granting Mayo's
motion to change custody and abused its discretion by eliciting
testimony. 32 5 North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.6(6) provides:
The court may modify a prior custody after the two-year
period following the date of entry of an order establishing
custody if the court finds:
1. On the basis of the facts that have arisen since the prior
order or which were unknown to the court at the time of the
prior order, a material change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or the parties; and
2. The modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the
26

child.3

The court noted "[a] material change in circumstances occurs when
new facts are presented that were unknown to the moving party at the
time the decree was entered." 32 7 The court found that the trial court
considered the testimony and reports by three psychologists regarding
the existence and effects of parentification on the children. 3 2 8 Each
psychologist's testimony was given the requisite weight the trial court
deemed appropriate. 32 9 Therefore, the court held the trial court's
finding of parentification of the oldest child and the possibility of
parentification in the second oldest child constituted a material change in
circumstances and was not clearly erroneous. 330
Using the factors set forth in North Dakota Century Code section
14-09-6.2(1), the court then decided whether changing custody was
necessary to serve the children's best interests. 33 1 The court concluded
323. Id.
324. Id. 13.
325. Id. 14.
326. N.D. CENT CODE § 14-09-06.6(6) (1997).
327. Mayo, 116, 619 N.W.2d at 635-36 (citing In re N.C.C., 2000 ND 129, 18, 612 N.W.2d
561,566).
328. Id. 25, 619 N.W.2d at 637. Dr. Will testified parentification is a "construct that's been
developed," and "described parentification as the process in which the child loses his or her childhood
after assuming the responsibilities of a parent." Id. 18, 619 N.W.2d at 636. "Dr. Ascano testified
parentification results in 'pseudo-maturity,' characterized by children acting very responsible and
trying very hard to be good care takers." Id. 17. "Dr. Timm testified parentification is 'one facet of
role reversal,"' and the result from parentification can cause "sleep loss, obsessive thoughts,
perfectionism, over-extension, and depression." Id. 19.
329. Id. 25, 619 N.W.2d at 637.
330. Id.
331. Id. 26.
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that after weighing the best interests of the children against the backdrop
of stability of the relationship with Banjac, the trial court was correct by
deeming the danger of damage from parentification greater than the
damage from the loss of custodial stability. 332 Next, the court stated that
the trial court gave appropriate weight to testimony by one of the
psychologists which strongly favored granting permanent custody to
Mayo. 33 3 The court also found that Mayo's motion to change custody
was brought in good faith and was not brought to prevent Banjac from
moving. 33 4 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that
there had been a substantial change in circumstances which, in the best
335
interests of the children, warranted a change of custody.
Justice Maring, writing for herself, dissented. 3 36 Justice Maring
stated that she was left with the "definite and firm conviction [that] a
3 37
mistake ha[d] been made" by the trial court and the majority.
Justice Maring did not believe that the trial court properly weighed
the stability and best interest factors in determining custody. 3 38 Justice
Maring argued that there was "no significant change in circumstances
that . . . required a transfer of custody" from Banjac to Mayo. 33 9 In
support of this argument, Justice Maring questioned the trial court's
reliance on the medical professionals that testified for Mayo, while it
discounted the medical professionals that testified for Banjac. 3 4 0
Specifically, Justice Maring questioned whether the oldest child had
become "parentified." 34 1
Justice Maring also noted that since the case at bar was not an
original custody hearing, a "presumption exists that the child is better
off with the custodial parent, and close calls should be resolved in favor
of continuing custody." 342 Since Mayo had not advanced an argument
332. Id. 30, 619 N.W.2d at 638.
333. Id. 35, 619 N.W.2d at 639.
334. Id. 37.
335. Id. 38.
336. Id. 42, 619 N.W.2d at 640 (Maring, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. Id. 43.
339. Id. 45.
340. Id. Justice Maring characterized Mayo's expert's opinion as "questionable." Id. 49, 619
N.W.2d at 641. Further, she questioned the reasoning of the trial court in finding Banjac's expert's
opinion not credible. Id.
341. Id. 45, 619 N.W.2d at 640. Justice Maring noted that the "alleged parentification occurs
when Banjac is forced to lie down for one hour each month as a result of her condition." Id. Because
Banjac had to lie down for some period of time, the oldest child assumed a caretaking role. Id. This
caretaking role was not unique, Justice Maring argued, because children of similar age as the oldest
child often contribute to the family when needed. Id. This was not, in Justice Maring's opinion,
parentification but rather was a "common life experience." Id.
342. Id. 51, 619 N.W.2d at 642 (citing Myers v. Myers, 1999 ND 194, 10, 601 N.W.2d 264).
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that outweighed the stability that the children would receive with Banjac,
the court should not have changed custody to Mayo. 3 43 Finally, Justice
Maring disagreed with the trial court and the majority in the remedy
used. 3 4 4
In so disagreeing, Justice Maring stated that "[i]f
parentification indeed exists, however, the effects of it can be eliminated
through methods other than change of custody." 3 45
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHANGE OF CUSTODY
HENDRICKSON

v.

HENDRICKSON

Mark and Diane Hendrickson married in August 1980.346 Mark
worked in Dickinson, while Diane worked and lived with the children in
the family home in Jamestown. 34 7 Mark was able to be there only on
weekends and holidays. 3 48 This long-distance relationship took its toll,
and when the marriage ended, the four children had a weak relationship
with their father. 34 9 Diane was granted custody of the children, with
reasonable visitation for Mark.350
From the date of Diane's filing for divorce (November 30, 1993),
through seven years of litigation, Mark had difficulty exercising his
visitation rights. 3 5 1 Diane frustrated visitation by taking the children
away from the home when Mark was scheduled to arrive to pick them
up, scheduling activities for the children that would prevent their being
with their father, refusing to cooperate with Mark when he would telephone to schedule visits, and telling the children they did not have to go
with their father. 35 2 The guardian ad litem and the trial court judge
agreed that the children suffered from parental alienation syndrome. 35 3
This was the result of Diane's years of alienating the children from their
father. 35 4 The trial court judge changed custody of the children to
Mark, ordered Diane to pay child support, denied visitation of the
children with Diane for one year, and ordered her to go to counseling
with a counselor chosen by Mark.355
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id. 53.
Id. Such other methods included therapy for the oldest child. Id.
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 2, 603 N.W.2d 896, 898.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 3.
Id. at 898-99.
Id.
Id. at 899.
Id. 8, 603 N.W.2d at 899-900.
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Diane's appeal brought Hendrickson v. Hendrickson3 56 up to the
North Dakota Supreme Court for the third time. 3 5 7 The court had to

consider four issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied change of venue, 3 58 (2) whether it was erroneous to
change custody to Mark,3

59

(3) whether it was erroneous to deny

year,3 60

and (4) whether the trial court abused'
visitation to Diane for one
its discretion when it ordered Diane to attend counseling with a counsel3 61
or of Mark's choice.
The first issue arose when Diane's motion that the hearing below be
changed to a different location for the convenience of the witnesses was
denied. 36 2 This court noted that an evidentiary hearing had taken place
prior to the hearing below. 36 3 The hearing below was on remand from

the North Dakota Supreme Court as part of its holdings in its second
hearing of Hendrickson v. Hendrickson.364 There was no need for
witnesses at the remand hearing; therefore, no witnesses were
365
inconvenienced and it was not necessary to change venue.
Diane had many contentions that the trial court erred when it
changed custody to Mark: the custody change was in fact a sanction for
contempt of court; the trial court below had no power to change the
custody, and even if it did have that power, the court below could not
change the custody without an evidentiary hearing; there was no
evidence to support the trial court's decision; and finally, Diane contended that she did not get a chance to cross-examine the guardian ad
litem in the court below. 3 6 6

The court dismissed all of these

367

contentions.
First, there was no language showing a contempt sanction in the
lower court's order. 368 Second, Mark had requested change of custody
in his cross-appeal in the second Hendrickson v. Hendrickson.3 69 That
gave the lower court the power to change custody on the remand
356. 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896.
357. See generally Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1996); Hendrickson v.
Hendrickson, 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d
896.
358. Hendrickson, 1 10, 603 N.W.2d at 900.
11-20, 603 N.W.2d at 900-02.
359. Id.
360. Id. 21, 603 N.W.2d at 902-03.
361. Id. $T 22-23, 603 N.W.2d at 903.
362. Id. 9, 603 N.W.2d at 900.
363. Id. 10.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. 91 12, 16, 20, 603 N.W.2d at 900-02.
367. Id. TT 13-20, 603 N.W.2d at 901-02.
368. Id. 13, 603 N.W.2d at 901.
369. Id. 1 14.
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hearing. 37 0 This court stated that it contemplated a change of custody
during the remand hearing. 37 1 Third, this court restated that the remand
hearing was preceded by an evidentiary hearing; therefore, a second
evidentiary hearing was not required to change custody on remand. 37 2
Diane's assertion of no evidence to change custody relied on the
two-step analysis a court must apply when it considers a change of
custody: (1) whether there had been a significant change of circumstances since the divorce, and (2) if there has been a significant change
of circumstances, whether that change required a change of custody to
protect the best interests of the child. 3 7 3 The court listed many of
Diane's actions that contributed to alienation of the children toward their
father as well as the frustration of Mark's visitations. 374 This court and
the courts below had made many attempts to improve the visitation, but
none of them had succeeded. 3 7 5 The court ultimately relied on the
Custody Modification statute. 376 The statute states that persistent frustration of visitation could make a change of custody necessary when it
creates an environment that "may endanger the child's physical or
emotional health or impair the child's emotional development." 377 This
statute and the many attempts to make a more rigid visitation schedule
satisfied the two-step analysis required for evidence that a change of
custody is required. 37 8 This court did not address Diane's last assertion
regarding change of custody that she did not get a chance to
cross-examine the guardian ad litem in the court below, because Diane
raised the issue for the first time in her reply brief. 379
The court rejected the notion that Diane should be denied visitation
for one year.3 80 The children have a right to visitation with the noncustodial parent, and that right should not be denied them unless the visitation would "endanger the child's physical or emotional health."381 The
370. Id.
371. Id. 15.
372. Id.
373. Id. 16 (citing Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker, 1997 ND 72, 6, 562 N.W.2d 390).
374. Id. 17 (taking the children away when visitations were scheduled, refusing to let the
children go with Mark, and refusing to cooperate when Mark tried to schedule visitations).
375. Id. 18 (relying on Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992) where it states
that a court must set up a more rigid visitation schedule as a first step when there is frustration of
visitation by the custodial parent).
376. N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-09-06.6.5(a) & (b) (1997).
377. Id.
378. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 19, 603 N.W.2d 896, 902.
379. Id. 20.
380. Id. 21.
381. Id. 21 (citing Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992)).

2001]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

623

court determined that supervised visitation should be tried before Diane
is denied visitation. 382
This court also rejected the lower court's order that Mark choose a
counselor for Diane. 38 3 It ordered that the trial court should obtain a list
of counselors from both Diane and Mark and then choose the counselor
384
for Diane from the names on the lists.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that (1) the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied a change of venue; (2) there was
enough evidence to warrant changing custody of the children to Mark;
(3) Diane as the noncustodial parent was entitled to supervised visitations; and (4) the counselor for Diane was to be chosen from among the
list of names to be supplied to the trial court by both Mark and Diane. 385
The court remanded the case for modification. 386
FAMILY LAW-EQUITABLE ADOPTION
JOHNSON V. JOHNSON

In Johnson v. Johnson,3 87 Madonna Johnson appealed a divorce
judgment, challenging the trial court's denial of child support and
spousal support and its division of the parties' property. 38 8 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 3 89
Madonna and Antonyio Johnson were married in 1986.390 At the
time, they were both in the United States Air Force, stationed in
England. 39 1 Subsequently, the Johnsons were transferred to McGuire
Air Force Base in the state of New Jersey. 3 92 While living there in 1988,
the Johnsons received a phone call. 3 93 It was from Michelle Clayton,
Madonna's daughter-in-law. 394 Michelle related that David, Madonna's
son, was in jail, and she was left with two small children in
382. Id. at 903.
383. Id. 22.
384. Id. 24.
385. Id. 25.
386. Id. Subsequent events resulted in the courts again changing custody of the children. See
generally In re C.H., 2001 ND 37, 622 N.w.2d 720.
387. 2000 ND 170, 617 N.w.2d 97.
388. Johnson, 1, 617 NW.2d at 99.
389. Id. at 100.
390. Id. 2.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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Pennsylvania. 3 95 The youngest child, Jessica, was David's child. 39 6
Because Michelle had no money and no place to stay, the Johnsons went
to Pennsylvania and brought Michelle and the children back to New
Jersey with them. 39 7 She stayed a week with the Johnsons.398 When she
left, Michelle asked the Johnsons to take Jessica, then age three months,
until Michelle got back on her feet. 399 Madonna and Antonyio Johnson
agreed to help out.400 Madonna, planning to keep Jessica for thirty days,
obtained a temporary order of custody; but, Michelle never returned to
claim Jessica. 40 1
In the ten years that followed, the Johnsons raised Jessica as their
own child, even allowing her to believe for a time that they were her
parents. 40 2 Antonyio listed Jessica as his dependent on his federal tax
returns.4 0 3 The Johnsons initiated adoption proceedings in both New
Jersey and Kentucky, obtaining consent from the natural parents, but
4 04
each time they were transferred before completion of the adoption.
Eventually Antonyio grew dissatisfied with his marriage, and after
being assigned to the Grand Forks Air Force Base, he initiated divorce
proceedings in North Dakota. 40 5 During the divorce trial, Madonna
claimed that she and Antonyio had equitably adopted Jessica, and she
sought child support from Antonyio. 406 The trial court concluded that
North Dakota did not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption and
refused to impose a child support obligation upon Antonyio. 407
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court,
finding that North Dakota does recognize equitable adoptions.4 0 8 The
court said the doctrine of equitable adoption is grounded in the equitable principle that equity regards as "that which ought to have been done
is to be regarded as done in favor of one to whom and against one from
whom performance is due." 4 0 9 The court noted the doctrine is an
equitable remedy to enforce a contract right and bears almost no
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. 6, 617 N.W.2d at 100-01.
Id. 7, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
Id.
Id. 8.
Id. 9 (citing 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16.21, at 471 (4th ed. 1997)).
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relationship to a statutory legal adoption. 4 10 The court cited three prior
North Dakota cases which had dealt with equitable adoption, and it
concluded that longstanding precedent recognized the doctrine because
the court has repeatedly held that a contract to adopt may be specifically
enforced in equity. 4 11 Therefore, the supreme court held the trial court
erred in concluding the doctrine of equitable adoption is unknown to
North Dakota law.4 12
The court observed that although the prior cases dealt with contracts
to adopt only in the context of inheritance law, the doctrine also applies
in the domestic context of child support and child custody.4 1 3 The court
found that North Dakota has a strong public policy that the best interests
of children take precedence in cases involving their well-being. 4 14
Applying the doctrine of equitable adoption to impose a child support
obligation, when circumstances require it, fully comports with this public
policy. 4 15
Applying the law to this case, the court noted that in order for the
doctrine to apply, something more than an agreement to adopt is
required. 4 16 Courts must look at whether there exist indicia of a true
parent-child relationship between the child and the equitable parent. 4 17
Whether the facts warranted application of the doctrine to impose a child
support obligation upon Antonyio was a question of fact to be resolved
by the trial court. 4 18 Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case
and ordered the trial court to resolve the factual question. 4 19 The
supreme court upheld that part of the trial court's decision which
refused to divide the parties' military pensions, and it refused to impose
a spousal support obligation upon Antonyio. 42 0
Justice Sandstrom dissented, stating that under the facts if an
equitable adoption had taken place, it occurred in New Jersey or
Kentucky and would be governed by the law in those states, neither of
which even recognize the doctrine. 42 1 Justice Sandstrom believed the
majority was ignoring precedent and invading the province of the
410. Id.
411. Id. 11, 617 N.W.2d at 102 (citing Klein v. Klein, 286 N.W. 898 (N.D. 1939), Borner v.
Larms, 293 N.W. 836 (N.D. 1940), Muhihauser v. Becker, 20 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1945)).
412. Id. 17, 617 N.W.2d at 103.
413. Id. 18, 617 N.W.2d at 103-04.
414. Id. 24, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
415. Id. 22, 617 N.W.2d at 104-05.
416. Id. 38, 617 N.W.2d at 109.
417. Id. 39 (quoting 2 AM. JUR 2D Adoption § 55 (1994)).
418. Id. 741,617 N.W.2d at 110 (citing 2 AM. JUR. 2DAdoption § 53 (1994)).
419. Id.
420. Id. 47, 617 N.W.2d at 111.
421. Id. 57, 617 N.W.2d at 112.
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legislature, which has enacted a detailed statutory scheme relating to
adoption procedures. 42 2 Justice Sandstrom stated that under the
majority's new rule, child support could be imposed under the auspices
of equitable adoption upon essentially any person other than a parent or
stepparent. 4 23 In the absence of a statute expressly addressing the issue,
making social policy is a matter for the legislature, not the courts. 4 24 He
also expressed doubts about the constitutionality of concluding that
equitable adoptions may occur without the formal requisites required for
the termination of parental rights. 425 Finally, Justice Sandstrom observed
that the vast majority of states do not recognize child support obligations
as a result of equitable adoptions. 4 26
FAMILY LAW-IMPUTED INCOME
LOGAN V. BUSH

In Logan v. Bush,4 2 7 Judy Logan appealed from an amended

judgment modifying her child support obligation. 4 28 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment allowing imputation of
income to Logan and denying her a credit for child support paid on
behalf of her daughter Stephanie after May 1998.429 The court also
reversed the portion of the amended judgment setting the amount of
support and remanded for recalculation of child support.4 30
Judy Logan and John Bush were divorced in 1990.431 Joint custody
was awarded, with physical custody of the parties' three minor children
to alternate every three months.4 32 On January 31, 1994, an amended
judgment was entered granting Bush custody of the children, with Logan
to have visitation "not exceeding two months." 4 33 Logan was then
ordered to pay child support. 4 34
422. Id. 62.
423. Id. 73, 617 N.W.2d at 115.
424. Id. 76, 617 N.W.2d at 116.
425. Id. 90, 617 N.W.2d at 118.
426. Id. 106, 617 N.W.2d at 121.
427. 2000 ND 203, 621 N.W.2d 314.
428. Logan, 1, 621 N.W.2d at 315.
429. Id. 43, 621 N.W.2d at 323.
430. Id.
431. Id. 2, 621 N.W.2d at 315.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. The order to pay child support provided:
Plaintiff shall pay and the Defendant shall receive child support for the three minor
children, in an amount of $758.00 per month. Said payments will be prorated upon a ten
month (10) period to reflect an average payment of $632.00 per month. Payment of the
amount in child support shall continue until the child attains the age of eighteen (18)
years or if, upon attaining the age of eighteen (18) years, the child has not yet graduated

2001]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

627

Following the divorce, Logan's income increased substantially when
she remarried and moved to California. 4 35 On September 7, 1999, the
State, on Bush's behalf, brought a motion to amend the 1994 amended
judgment and increase Logan's child support obligation due to her
increase in income. 4 36 While the matter was pending, Logan and her
husband quit their jobs and moved to Arizona where they accepted lower
paying positions. 4 3 7 On December 14, 1999, Logan was ordered to pay
increased child support based upon imputed income under North
Dakota Administrative Code section 75-02-04.1-07(9).438 Logan was
also not entitled to an adjustment of support for extended visitation
under section 75-02-04.1-08.1, and she was not entitled to a credit for
alleged overpayment of support for Stephanie after May 1998.439 On
May 15, 2000, the district court affirmed the referee's findings of fact
44
and conclusions of law.44 0 Logan appealed. 1
Logan argued that her child support should have been calculated
solely upon her reduced income in Arizona and that it was an error to
impute income to her under section 75-02-04.1-07(9) based upon her
prior income in California. 4 4 2 The Child Support Guidelines state that
an obligor's ability to pay child support is not determined solely upon
actual income, but that an obligor's earning capacity is also taken into
account. 4 43 "A parent has a duty to support her children to the best of
her abilities, not simply to her inclinations." 444 If an obligor's income
is decreased based on a voluntary change in employment, it is the
obligor that should bear the sacrifice rather than her children. 445 Logan
voluntarily left her job in California and accepted a lower paying job in
Arizona. 44 6 Therefore, the court held that the imputation of income was
authorized under section 75-02-04.1-07(9).447
from high school and continues to reside with Defendant, until the child's graduation
from high school, but in no event shall the child support obligation continue beyond the
child's nineteenth (19th) birthday.
Id.
435. Id. 3.
436. Id. 4, 621 N.W.2d at 315-16.
437. Id. 5, 621 N.W.2d at 316.
438. Id. 6.
439. Id. Stephanie, the parties' oldest daughter, turned eighteen in August 1997 and graduated
from high school in May 1998. Id. 3, 621 N.W.2d at 315.
440. Id. 16, 621 N.W.2d at 316.
441. Id.
442. Id. 7.
443. Id. 9 (citing Buchholz v. Buchholz, 1999 ND 36,
13, 590 N.w.2d 215; Otterson v.
Otterson, 1997 ND 232, 10, 571 N.W.2d 648).
444. Id. 15, 621 N.W.2d at 317 (quoting Henry v. Henry, 2000 ND 10, 6, 604 N.W.2d 234,
236).
445. Id.
446. Id. 17, 621 N.W.2d at 318.
447. Id.
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Logan also contended that even if imputation of income was
authorized under section 75-02-04.1-07(9), the amount to be imputed
was incorrect. 44 8 A formula for calculating imputed income is clearly set
out in North Dakota Administrative Code section 75-02-04.1-07(9).449
This section requires the imputed income to be calculated based upon
the obligor's actual income in a prior twelve-month period. 4 50 Simply
choosing the highest nine months and extrapolating that to a
twelve-month period will not suffice. 4 51 The court stated that the highest
twelve-month period for which reliable evidence was presented was
Logan's 1999 income. 4 52 Thus, because the referee erred in calculating
the imputed income, the court reversed and remanded for recalculation
of child support based upon Logan's income in 1999.453
In addition, Logan contended she was entitled to an adjustment of
child support under section 75-02-04.1-08.1 because she had extended
visitation with the children. 4 54 The court stated that section 75-02-04.108.1 requires consideration of the length of visitation "scheduled by
court order," not the amount of visitation actually exercised. 4 55 The
clear intent was that Logan would have extended summer visitation of
two months, with the exact dates to be determined by the parties. 4 5 6
Therefore, the court held the child support must be calculated under
section 75-02-04.1-08.1.457
Finally, Logan contended that the referee erred in failing to provide
a credit for child support paid on behalf of Stephanie Bush after her
graduation from high school in May 1998.458 The court stated that it
would be unfair to allow Logan a credit for "overpayment" of support
when in fact she had been underpaying and depriving her children of
support. 4 59 Logan's obligation to Stephanie ceased in 1998, and she
could have moved for modification of child support at any time after
448. Id. 18.
449. Id. The formula for calculating imputed income is the monthly gross income equal to one
hundred percent of the obligor's greatest average monthly earnings, in any twelve consecutive months
beginning on or after thirty-six months before commencement of the proceeding before the court, for
which reliable evidence is provided, less actual monthly gross earnings. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §
75-02-04.1-07(9) (1999).
450. Logan v. Bush, 2000 ND 203, 21, 621 N.W.2d 314, 318.
451. Id.
452. Id. 22, 621 N.W.2d at 319.
453. Id.
454. Id. 23.
455. Id. 26.
456. Id. 31, 621 N.W.2d at 321.
457. Id.
458. Id. 32.
459. Id. 41, 621 N.W.2d at 323.
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this date. 4 6 0 Thus, the court held that it would not reward Logan's
461
inaction by allowing a credit for a phantom "overpayment."
INSURANE-BENEFITS
NODAK MUTUAL FARM BUREAU V. KOSMATKA

James and Kathleen Nelson appealed from a court order granting
partial summary judgment determining that the Nelsons were not
allowed to receive funds interpleaded by Nodak Mutual Farm Bureau
(Nodak).462 The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,
concluding the district court improvidently granted certification under
Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.4 6 3 The case
arose from an motor vehicle accident in which a vehicle driven by Scott
Johnson collided with a vehicle driven by James Nelson.4 6 4 There was
one fatality - Matthew Nelson, the son of James Nelson who was a
passenger in the Nelson vehicle.4 6 5 All three of Johnson's passengers
(Jason Kosmatka, Nathan Lubarski, and Holly Anderson) were
injured.4 6 6 The Nelsons were awarded $610,000.467 In addition, they
received $200,000 for the pain and suffering Matthew endured before
his death.4 6 8 Johnson's insurance with Nodak had "bodily injury limits
4 69
of $50,000 for 'each person' and $100,000 for 'each occurrence."'
Nodak paid the Nelsons $50,000 under the "per person" provision, and
the Nelsons sought the remaining $50,000 "occurrence" limit. 47 0 Due
to the possible claims of Johnson's three passengers, Nodak interpleaded
the remaining $50,000 of Johnson's policy limit by depositing the sum
with the district court. 47 1 Kosmatka sought partial summary judgment to
establish that the Nelsons were not entitled to collect any of the deposited funds. 4 72 The district court granted Kosmatka's motion and granted
a request for Rule 54(b) certification allowing immediate appeal to the
473
North Dakota Supreme Court.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id.
Id.
Nodak Mut. Farm Bureau v. Kosmatka, 2000 ND 210,
Id.
Id. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. 3, 619 N.W.2d at 854.
Id.

1, 619 N.W.2d 852, 853.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court found certification to be
inappropriate. 4 74 The court stated that "[i]f a trial court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay, [then] Rule 54(b) . . . allows
entry of 'final judgment adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all parties."' 475 The court noted that in the
present case the "question of whether the Nelsons may share in the
deposited funds is unique, and apparently one of first impression." 4 7 6
However, Rule 54(b) certification is inappropriate when further developments in the trial court may make an issue moot. 4 77 Further, a party
seeking immediate review has the burden of establishing an unusual
hardship in order to obtain a Rule 54(b) certification. 478
Based on the facts of this case, the court found no evidence of
extraordinary circumstances, nor any unusual hardship that would occur
in the absence of immediate review, other than potentially lengthened
proceedings in the district court or possible complications in the distribution of funds between the parties.4 79 "Absent evidence of hardship or
prejudice, certification was improper." 48 0 The mere possibility that an
order may be appealed or reversed does not warrant a piecemeal approach to resolving litigation, especially in light of the strong public
policy against piecemeal claims. 4 81 Therefore, the appeal was
dismissed.482
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE

BLACK v. ABEX

In Black v. Abex, 48 3 Rochelle Black appealed a district court order
granting a motion to dismiss her wrongful death and survival claims
which were based on market share and alternative liability.4 84 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order finding that
there was no genuine issue of material fact.4 85
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Id. 7.
Id. 4.
Id. 10, 619 N.W.2d at 855.
Id.
Id. 8, 619 N.W.2d at 854.
Id. 9, 619 N.W.2d at 854-55.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id. 14.
1999 ND 236, 603 N.W.2d 182.
Black, 1,603 N.W.2d at 184.
Id.
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Markus Black was an auto mechanic for the United States Air Force
(Air Force) from 1971 to 1986.486 He died of lung cancer in 1988.487
After Markus' death, his wife, Rochelle Black, brought suit against
forty-eight manufacturers that produced parts containing asbestos,
alleging that Markus died becuase of occupational exposure to asbestosClaims against forty-four of these
containing products. 4 8 8
4 89
manufacturers were either settled or dismissed by the time of trial.
Presently, North Dakota has no statutes or case law dealing with
either market share liability, or alternative liability, in relation to
asbestos-containing products. 4 9 0 This is a case of first impression for
4
both market share liability and alternative liability in North Dakota. 91
The central issue in determining whether to allow this lawsuit to proceed
was to determine whether the defendants' products carried approximately equal amounts of risk. 4 92 Public policy considerations favored
an innocent plaintiff attempting to recover against defendants that
produced a product that had a "singular risk factor." 4 9 3 If it could be
shown that there was a "singular risk factor," then the court would shift
the burden of proof onto the manufacturers to prove that they were not
liable.

4 94

The North Dakota Supreme Court set out the market share liability
requirements: (1) that the injury or illness is caused by products that are
fungible and made by the defendants in the lawsuit; (2) that the injury or
illness is due to a design hazard, which makes the product unreasonably
dangerous; (3) that the plaintiff can not name or identify the
manufacturer of the product that caused the injury; and (4) that enough
4 95
defendants are joined to represent a substantial share of the market.
The court stated that most courts addressing market share liability for
asbestos cases have found the theory to be inappropriate, because
49 6
asbestos is not a fungible product.

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
risk. Id.
494.
495.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2.

4, at 184 n.1.
25, 603 N.W.2d at 189.
7, 603 N.W.2d at 184.
27, 603 N.W.2d at 189.
A singular risk factor is the same or similar products that contain an equal percentage of

11, 603 N.W.2d at 185 (citing W.

LAW OF TORTS § 103 at 714 (5th ed. (1984))).

496. Id. 12, 603 N.W.2d at 185-86.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
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Black also argued that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims
based upon the theory of alternative liability. 497 The court stated that the
critical element when trying to apply alternative liability is that all the
potentially responsible parties should be brought into the courtroom as
defendants.4 9 8 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that unlike
the hunters in the case of Summers v. Tice,499 the asbestos manufacturers
did not "fire the same shot," since the hazards attached to the products
carried varying risks. 500
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
KAUTZMAN v. MCDONALD

After Cass County deputy sheriffs and North Dakota Highway
patrolmen shot Paul and Susan Kautzman's dogs to death, the
Kautzmans sued Cass County, the State, and the individual officers
involved. 50 1 On February 19, 1999, the dogs escaped from the
Kautzmans' home in Cass County. 502 Police received several calls
regarding the wandering dogs. 5 03 Law enforcement shot the dogs when
they roamed into Fargo city limits. 504
The Kautzmans' complaint alleged the law enforcement officers
violated a Cass County ordinance and state statutes by committing
"'intentional, wrongful, negligent, grossly negligent, and/or wilful acts,'
and for intentional infliction of emotional distress." 50 5 The trial court
granted defendants a dismissal because the Kautzmans failed to give
timely notice to the Office of Management and Budget within 180 days
of the injury. 506 The trial court also dismissed the claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the law enforcement officers'
conduct did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. 50 7 The
Kautzmans appealed the lower court's decision on four alleged errors. 5 08
First, the Kautzmans argued that because the law enforcement
officials were sued in their individual and official capacities, the trial
497. Id. 9 32, 603 N.W.2d at 191.
498. Id. 35 (citing Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. 1989)).
499. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
500. Id. TT 33, 35, 603 N.W.2d at 191-92 (quoting Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) and discussing Summers, 199 P.2d at 2-3).
501. Kautzman v. McDonald, 2001 ND 20, 1, 621 N.W.2d 871, 873.
502. Id. 2.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. 3, 621 N.W.2d at 873-74.
506. Id. 4, 621 N.W.2d at 874.
507. Id.
508. Id.
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court erred in dismissing the claims against the individual officers
involved. 5 09 The court noted that the Kautzmans' complaint failed to
use the terminology ordinarily used to indicate that a government
employee is liable in an official and individual capacity.510 In holding
the officers were not sued in their individual capacity, the court noted
that the complaint listed the "official government title" of the officials
and used the titles throughout the complaint. 5 11 Additionally, there was
no mention in the complaint that the officials acted outside their scope
of employment. 5 12 The fact that the Kautzmans brought a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was not enough to suggest an
intention to sue the officers in their individual capacities.513
Second, the Kautzmans argued that the trial court erred in finding
that the Office of Management and Budget did not receive timely notice
of the claim. 5 14 The Kautzmans also argued that the statute of limitations should not run until they had discovered all elements of the
claim. 5 15 The Kautzmans alleged that they did not know they had a
claim until after they discovered that one of the deputies "falsely
reported"in an investigation report the distance from which he shot one
of the dogs. 5 16 The court rejected this argument because Mr. Kautzman
began an investigation of the incident after the shooting, and the report
only confirmed what he had suspected.517 Additionally, the court noted
that the Kautzmans filed a timely complaint with the Assistant Attorney
General but failed to deliver a copy to the Office of Management and
Budget.518

In the Kautzmans' third claim, they argued that the trial court erred
in dismissing their claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 5 19 The North Dakota Supreme court addressed whether the
officers' conduct was "extreme and outrageous." 5 20 The court concluded that the officers' conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct. 52 1 First, there was no evidence that the law enforcement officers knew the dogs belonged to the Kautzmans; therefore, they
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

5.
6.
7.
8.
10, 621 N.W.2d at 875.
12.
13.
17, 621 N.W.2d at 876.
19.
22, 621 N.W.2d at 877.
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could not have intended to harm the Kautzmans. 5 22 Second, the discrepancy regarding the distance from which the dogs were shot, indicating
523
necessity for the shooting, did not constitute outrageous conduct.
Finally, the Kautzmans argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their tort claim against Cass County and the deputy sheriffs. 52 4 The
court concluded that the state statute and county ordinance upon which
52 5
the Kautzmans relied did not provide a private cause of action.
However, the court noted that the owners of domestic animals may
recover for a third person's wilful acts resulting in death or injury to the
animal. 52 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred in
527
dismissing the Kautzmans' negligence claim.
Cass County argued that the negligence claim should be dismissed
because of discretionary immunity. 528 The court outlined the two-step
inquiry to establish whether discretionary immunity applied. 529 First, the
conduct at issue must be discretionary, "involving an element of judgment or choice for the acting employee." 5 30 Second, the discretionary
judgment or choice must be "of the kind the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield." 53 1 The court concluded that the
officers' actions did not qualify for discretionary immunity because
"no social, economic or political policy" was involved. 532 Instead, the
actions of the officers were made as routine job duties involving individualized judgment. 5 33 Therefore, the court remanded the case for the
determination regarding negligence on the part of the officers and
County for the death of the Kautzmans' dogs. 534
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24, 621 N.W.2d at 878.
26.
27.
28, 621 N.W.2d at 878-79.
29, 621 N.W.2d at 879.
30.

32.
35, 621 N.W.2d at 880.
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WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW-BENEFITS
HOLEN V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU

535
In Holen v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau,
Marilyn Holen appealed from the district court's judgment upholding
the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau's (Bureau) order
denying her benefits for aggravation of a prior work injury. 53 6 Holen
injured her back in a 1994 work-related accident, at which time she filed
for and received benefits. 5 37 She subsequently underwent surgery,
participated in a functional capacity evaluation, and was assigned certain
work-related restrictions. 538
Thereafter, the Bureau approved a rehabilitation plan and issued an
order denying Holen further disability and vocational rehabilitation
benefits. 5 39 A vocational rehabilitation representative referred Holen to a
position in a doughnut stand inside a Wal-Mart store, where she worked
until February 1997.540 Afterwards, she applied for a position in the
Wal-Mart snack bar, where she signed a job matrix indicating that she
could perform the following activities: bending, twisting, squatting, and
lifting up to fifty pounds. 54 1 In November of 1997, Holen's physician
recommended that she stop working; consequently, she then reapplied
for disability benefits. 542
The Bureau denied Holen's claim, reasoning that she knowingly
exceeded her treatment recommendations, and as a result, her back
injury was aggravated. 54 3 Holen then requested a hearing, which was
eventually held in December of that year. 544 The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) concluded that Holen had exceeded her treatment
recommendations, which subsequently aggravated her back injury; the
ALJ then denied her benefits in April 1999.545 The ALJ's finding and
recommendations were adopted by the Bureau in May, and Holen
appealed to the district court where the denial was affirmed. 546
535. 2000 ND 145, 615 N.W.2d 141.
536. Holen, 1, 615 N.W.2d at 142.
537. Id. 2.
538. Id. The functional capacity evaluation indicated that Holen was restricted to a light physical
demand level, including avoiding repetitious forward bending or stooping more than one percent of the
workday or squatting more than thirty-three percent of the workday. Id.
539. Id. 3, 615 N.W.2d at 143.
540. Id. 4.
541. Id.
542. Id. 5.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
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Upon appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Holen argued
that procedural delays violated her statutory and due process rights, but
the court held that she failed to show any substantial prejudice from the
procedural delays. 5 47 The court noted that in order "[t]o recover for
delay in administrative proceedings, a claimant must show she was
substantially prejudiced by the delay." 54 8 It held that because Holen did
not show how her circumstances would have been improved by an earlier
Bureau denial, she failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice. 54 9
Holen also argued that the ALJ erred in finding that she had
exceeded her treatment recommendations, which subsequently aggravated her back injury. 550 The court noted that "the Bureau must prove
the claimant knew of the specific work restrictions and intentionally
engaged in activities exceeding those restrictions before benefits can be
denied based on aggravation of a prior injury." 5 5 1 Based upon the
available information, the court held that neither the ALJ nor the Bureau
made the required finding that Holen knew of her specific restrictions
and that she intentionally exceeded such restrictions. 552 Consequently,
the court concluded that the Bureau's findings did not support application of North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-28(5); as such, it
reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings including the hearing of additional evidence consistent with its
opinion. 5 53
WORKERS COMPENSATION-DISABILITY BENEFITS

Tangen v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
The North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau (Bureau)
appealed from a judgment that reversed the Bureau's order which
denied further disability benefits to Brian Tangen. 554 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.555
547. Id. 7.
548. Id. 9, 615 N.W.2d at 144 (citing Wahl v. Morton County Soc. Servs., 1998 ND 48, 6, 574
N.W.2d 859, 862).
549. Id. 11.
550. Id. 12 (noting that N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(5) provides that if an employee undertakes
activities that exceed treatment recommendations and such activities aggravate the employee's
condition, the Bureau may not pay benefits pursuant to such aggravation unless the activities were
undertaken at the demand of an employer).
551. Id. 13, 615 N.W.2d at 144-45 (citing Tangen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND
135, 23, 613 N.W.2d 490, 496).
552. Id. at 145 (citing Tangen, 25, 613 N.W.2d at 496).
553. Id. IT 13-14.
554. Tangen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 135, 1, 613 N.W.2d 490, 491.
555. Id.
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Tangen suffered a work-related injury to his right knee in August
1992 while employed at National Sun Industries in Enderlin, North
Dakota. 5 56 The Bureau accepted Tangen's claim and paid benefits for
his injury. 5 57 In March 1994, Tangen began working at Artco in Thief
River Falls, Minnesota. 558 In December, Tangen underwent knee surgery
for the prior work injury. 5 5 9 In a letter dated February 27, 1995,
Tangen's doctor said he was able to return to work, although the doctor
placed several restrictions on Tangen's activities. 5 60 The doctor said
Tangen should not do any kneeling, squatting, or twisting activities with
56 1
heavy loads.
On May 19, 1995 Tangen was awarded partial disability benefits by
the Bureau. 5 62 In January 1997, Tangen began working at Sheldon's
Auto Parts. 563 In June 1997, Tangen's knee problems were aggravated,
requiring rest for a week. 56 4 He filed a reapplication for benefits and
received disability benefits for the short period he was off work. 5 65 In
August 1997, Tangen was reexamined by his doctor, who said that his
knee had worsened and it was no longer appropriate for him to do
activities requiring prolonged sitting or standing, kneeling, squatting, or
climbing ladders or stairs, or to carry loads of more than forty to fifty
pounds. 56 6
Tangen reapplied for disability benefits on August 18, 1997, and
the Bureau began paying benefits again. 56 7 On February 18, 1998, the
Bureau issued a Notice of Intent to Discontinue Benefits. 5 68 On February 27, the Bureau issued an order finding that benefits awarded on
Tangen's reapplications were paid in error and terminated any further
disability benefits. 56 9 Tangen requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that Tangen had failed to show a
significant change in his compensable medical condition, failed to show
5 70
actual wage loss, and voluntarily withdrawn from the job market.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.

Id. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. 3.
Id. It 3-4.
Id.
Id. 7 4, 613 N.W.2d at 492.
Id. 5.
Id. 75-6.
Id. 5.
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Tangen appealed to the district court, which reversed and remanded for
an order of benefits. 57 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court said that in appeals of judgments
involving administrative agencies, the court reviews the decision of. the
agency, and not the district court. 572 The court's review is limited to the
record before the agency. 57 3 The court stated it will affirm the agency's
decision unless the findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the conclusions of law are not supported by the
findings of fact, the decision is not supported by the conclusions of law,
the decision is not in accordance with the law or violates the claimant's
constitutional rights, or the agency rules and procedures deprived the
claimant of a fair hearing. 574
The first issue the court decided was whether North Dakota Century
Code section 65-05-28(5), which was passed in 1995, applied to this
case. 5 7 5 Tangen argued the law that should apply was the law that
existed in 1992 when he was first injured. 576 The Bureau argued that the
applicable law was the law in existence at the time of the reaggravation of
the injury. 57 7 The court agreed with the Bureau and found that section
65-05-28(5) applied here. 5 78
In finding that section 65-05-28(5) applied, the court noted that the
general rule is that "unless otherwise provided, the statutes in effect on
the date of injury govern a claimant's right to collect workers compensation benefits." 579 The Century Code is not to be applied retroactively
unless there is an express declaration of the legislature to do so. 5 80 The
North Dakota Supreme Court had not spoken on the issue of applying
this rule to the situation in which the original injury occurred before a
statutory change, but the aggravation of the prior injury occurred after a
new statute was in effect. 58 1 The court concluded that based on analogous case law, 582 common sense, and "a proper consideration of the
571. Id. 8, 613 N.W.2d at 493.
572. Id. 9.
573. Id. (citing Stewart v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 174, 9, 599 N.W.2d 280).
574. Id.
575. Id. 11.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id. 12.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. 13, 613 N.W.2d at 494.
582. Id. (citing Gregory v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 369 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1985)). In
Gregory, the court was faced with a case where a claimant was injured in 1958. Gregory, 369
N.W.2d at 120. He returned to work in 1981, but he was forced to quit due to the cumulative nature of
his injuries. Id. The claimant sought benefits in 1983 but was awarded benefits at the rate in effect at
the time of his injury, 1953. Id. The court found that the 1983 statutory rate applied because common
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statutory scheme," the 1995 law applied to Tangen's case. 583 Under this
law, payment of additional benefits to Tangen was precluded if the
Bureau could prove that Tangen had knowledge of specific physical
restrictions and intentionally undertook activities that exceeded those
restrictions. 5 84 Here, there was no evidence on this question, so the
supreme court remanded the case and said that the Bureau was free to
58 5
reopen the case to take additional evidence if deemed appropriate.
WORKERS COMPENSATION-TERMINATION OF BENEFITS
WANSTROM V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU

Orlyn Wanstrom was a Bismarck firefighter from May 1, 1974, until
June 30, 1997.586 On June 6, 1997, a doctor examined Wanstrom and
found that he suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD).587 The city of Bismarck placed him on medical leave, and on
July 3, 1997, Wanstrom filed a claim with the North Dakota Workers
Compensation Bureau (Bureau).588 He sought the application of a
statute that would presume his condition was suffered in the line of
duty.589 The Bureau found his twenty-three years as a firefighter "was
not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of his lung
disease," and therefore the statutory presumption had been rebutted and
the injury was not compensable. 590 The district court affirmed, and
Wanstrom appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 59 1
The court stated that in claims involving firefighters, an impairment
of health caused by lung problems is presumed to have been suffered in
the line of duty. 59 2 This presumption shifts the burden of persuasion
from the claimant to the Bureau. 59 3 Therefore, in this case the Bureau
sense teaches that an "impairment does not take place until it is manifest and determined to be
permanent." Id. at 122.
583. Tangen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 135, 15, 613 N.W.2d 490, 494.
584. Id. 22, 613 N.W.2d at 496.
585. Id. 29, 613 N.W.2d at 497.
586. Wanstrom v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 21, 621 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Wanstrom
II).
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id. $ 2-3. The relevant statute is NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE section 65-01-02(18)(d).
Originally, the Bureau found the statute was not applicable to Wanstrom because he was injured
before it was passed. Wanstrom v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 17, 1, 604 N.W.2d 860
(Wanstrom I). However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found Wanstrom was entitled to the
statutory presumption, finding that the application date was dispositive rather than the injury date. Id.
The Court then remanded the case for a determination of whether the presumption had been successfully rebutted. Id.
590. Wanstrom II, 4, 621 N.W.2d at 866.
591. Id.
592. Id. 6, 621 N.W.2d at 867.
593. Id. The presumption's goal "is to relieve firefighters of the nearly impossible burden of
proving firefighting actually caused their disease." Id.
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had the burden to prove that the nonexistence of the presumed fact, that
firefighting caused Wanstrom's condition, was more probable than its
existence. 59 4 The Bureau found that the greater weight of the evidence
showed Wanstrom's job did not substantially contribute to his COPD.595
The Bureau based this finding on testimony from two medical experts,
who both said they believed Wanstrom's condition was caused by over
thirty years of smoking. 596
The court found that the expert testimony was not enough to rebut
the statutory presumption. 5 97 The Bureau failed to address the agreement by both experts that COPD could be caused by multiple factors,
including firefighting. 59 8 The experts also agreed it was very unusual
for a man over forty years of age, such as Wanstrom, to develop COPD
solely from smoking. 599 These facts supported the presumption, and
because the Bureau never addressed them, the court found that the
presumption was not successfully rebutted. 6 0 0 The court therefore
remanded the case and ordered the Bureau to award benefits to
Wanstrom. 60 1
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